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Abstract 
Unemployment and inflation lower well-being. The macroeconomist Arthur Okun characterized 
the negative effects of unemployment and inflation by the misery index - the sum of the 
unemployment and inflation rates. This paper makes use of a large European dataset, covering 
the period 1975 to 2013, to estimate happiness equations in which an individual subjective 
measure of life satisfaction is regressed against unemployment and inflation rate (controlling for 
personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects). We find, conventionally, that both 
higher unemployment and higher inflation lower well-being. We also discover that 
unemployment depresses well-being more than inflation. We characterize this well-being trade-
off between unemployment and inflation using what we describe as the misery ratio. Our 
estimates with European data imply that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate lowers well-being by more than five times as much as a one percentage point increase in 
the inflation rate.  
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Unemployment and inflation are major targets of macroeconomic policy because a higher level 
of either of these variables has an adverse effect on welfare. The macroeconomist, Arthur Okun, 
developed a measure known as the “misery index” – the sum of the unemployment rate and the 
inflation rate – which was intended to capture how increased unemployment and inflation 
reduces national welfare. This measure implicitly assigns equal weights to the inflation and 
unemployment rates. Thus a period where the unemployment rate is 6 per cent and the inflation 
rate 3 percent is as bad as one where the unemployment rate is 2 per cent and the inflation rate 7 
per cent. There is no empirical justification for the use of equal weights.  Indeed, there is no 
consensus among macroeconomists on the relative size of these weights. 
Current macroeconomic policy tends to focus on a central bank whose function is to minimize a 
quadratic loss function with the economic structure (usually in the form of an IS curve and a 
Phillips curve) acting as a constraint on feasible combinations of unemployment and inflation. 
The central bank is required to keep the level of inflation close to target while minimizing the 
welfare losses associated with unemployment.1  More recently, central banks, including the US 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, introduced explicit labor market targets for monetary 
policy based on the unemployment rate.  However, when the unemployment rate fell more 
rapidly than expected both central banks broadened the list of measures they would focus on. 2  
The critical parameters within this loss function are the weights that the central bank places on 
unemployment and inflation; their ratio reveals the central bank’s implicit inflation-
unemployment tradeoff.   
This approach contrasts with directly collecting survey evidence on the public’s assessment of 
the relative costs of inflation and unemployment (Shiller, 1997).  Taking this direct approach a 
stage further, the rapidly developing study of happiness means that a more evidence-based 
approach can be taken to investigating the relative welfare costs of unemployment and inflation 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, 2011). 
                                                     
1 Frequently the loss function is described in terms of the output gap rather than unemployment gap. This requires a 
stable relationship between the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate and the output gap. This relation, 
known as the Okun’s Law, aims to tell us how much of a country GDP is lost when the unemployment rate is above 
its natural rate. 
 
2 For example in its statement from its March 2014 meeting the FOMC announced that 'To support continued 
progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly 
accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain the current 0 to 
1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess progress - both realized and expected -
toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a 
wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and 
inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments.  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140319a.htm.  
Further details of precisely which labor market variables the FOMC are focusing on was outlined by Governor Janet 
Yellen in two subsequent speeches 1) in Chicago on March 31st 2104 entitled 'What the Federal Reserve is doing to 
promote a stronger job market' http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm and 2) in 
New York on April 16, 2014 entitled 'Monetary Policy and the Economic Recovery'.  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm   
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In this paper we use individual survey data to determine the relative weights of unemployment 
and inflation on subjective well-being.3  We use these weights to compute a weighted misery 
ratio, the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment that is required to maintain subjective 
well being constant.  This approach takes self-reported well-being as a proxy for some 
underlying concept of utility and treats it as being directly measurable rather than being 
implicit.  Our approach does not assume that utility is implicit in consumers’ revealed 
preferences.  Clearly it shares common ground with Shiller, who focused primarily on the 
negative welfare effects of inflation.  The paper builds on earlier work by DiTella et al (2001, 
2003) with a broader list of countries and longer time series that includes the Great Recession. 
Our paper also utilizes new survey data and a new model specification. 
 
Our survey data comprise observations on more than 1.2 million Europeans over the period, 
1975 to 2012 taken from the Eurobarometer Survey which is conducted by the European 
Commission in all member states one or more times every year. 4 Our estimates imply that, 
across European countries, on average a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
lowers well-being by over five times as much as a one percentage point increase in the inflation 
rate.  This tradeoff between inflation and unemployment is not constant over time and has been 
higher during the Great Recession. Furthermore, we find a certain degree of heterogeneity in the 
inflation-unemployment trade off across European countries as well as socio-demographic 
groups.  
 
Our estimates suggest that the central bank weights may well differ from the socially preferred 
weights.  The political economy aspects of this finding are interesting, since for many central 
banks, the elected government sets the inflation target and therefore the implicit tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment.  The divergence between government and popular views of the 
appropriate tradeoff raise a number of interesting questions such as the information advantages 
that the government may enjoy, particularly where the dynamics of inflation and unemployment 
are taken into account. 
 
Section 1 considers the different approaches that have been developed to deal with welfare losses 
associated with inflation and unemployment, first by macroeconomists and then by researchers 
into subjective well-being.  Section 2 considers how the misery ratio has changed over time in 
Europe.  Section 3 estimates the size of the marginal rate of substitution between unemployment 
and inflation along the social welfare function using a dataset which merges Eurobarometer data 
on individual life satisfaction with macroeconomic data on inflation and unemployment.  Is 
unemployment more costly than inflation?  Our answer seems to be 'yes', at least in the period 
and over the countries considered.  Section 4 discusses and interprets these results using a more 
standard macroeconomic framework.  The final section concludes.  
1. Welfare Losses Associated with Inflation and Unemployment 
                                                     
3 The terms subjective or self-reported well-being, happiness and life satisfaction will be used interchangeably in the 
remainder. 
 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/index en.htm   
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Interpretations of the welfare costs of inflation focus on the real resource costs associated with 
asynchronous price changes or the reallocation of resources to government associated with 
increases in the money supply (inflation) and the resulting “inflation tax” - see Bailey (1956), 
Friedman (1971) and Lucas (2000).  Models of the costs of inflation associated with 
asynchronous pricing models include Lucas (1973), Barro (1976), Benabou and Gertner (1993) 
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).  For example, using structural VARs, Rotemberg and 
Woodford assess the relative costs of inflation and unemployment (incomplete stabilization) in 
a model where prices changes are staggered.  The underlying welfare function ultimately 
depends on consumption and leisure.  The welfare losses of inflation are indirect – they are due 
to the misallocation of resources associated with price instability, rather than due to a direct 
effect of inflation on utility.  Using this analysis to calibrate a welfare loss function based on 
the price level and the output gap, Woodford (2001) suggests that “the relative weight on the 
output gap measure should only be about 0.1” (p.47), implicitly concluding that the welfare 
gains from price stability are significantly greater than those from stabilizing output and 
therefore unemployment. 
Shiller (1997) used public attitudes surveys to investigate directly individual’s perceptions of the 
costs of inflation.  He showed that a primary concern of individuals is that inflation will reduce 
their standard of living. They also are concerned about being exploited by unscrupulous 
individuals or companies that cause prices to rise.  He summarizes this argument as the “bad-
actor-sticky-wage” explanation of the perceived welfare losses from inflation. Shiller’s 
contribution is quite distinct from other macroeconomic literature on the welfare effects of 
inflation, which tends to rely on a revealed preference approach to utility. 5   Typically, a 
representative agent’s utility is inferred through observation of her preferences and broader 
implications for the economy derived by assuming that there are no aggregation issues in moving 
from the agent to society as a whole.6  This contrasts with efforts to measure utility based on 
individual surveys.  The literature in this field typically assumes that responses to questions 
relating to “happiness”, “life satisfaction” or “subjective well-being” provide useful information 
relating to the latent utility measure widely used by economists. 7  However, one important 
distinction to which we subsequently return is that macroeconomists generally take a forward-
looking perspective on utility, in that their models frequently seek to maximize current and 
discounted future utility streams. The motive for asking such questions is to understand how far 
individuals judge their lives to be satisfactory.  Psychologists view it as natural that a concept 
such as happiness should be studied in part by asking people how they feel.  Economists, inured 
in the revealed-preference tradition, typically find this approach more difficult.  Nevertheless, 
surveys of subjective well-being have attracted the attention of medical statisticians, 
psychologists, and economists.  The latter include Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), 
                                                     
5 We treat welfare and utility as synonymous. 
 
6 Other assumptions regarding the degree of risk aversion and homogeneity between individual and aggregate 
consumption have to be made, implicitly or explicitly. 
 
7 As Krueger (2009) puts it, “I don't think the results are any less significant [for policy makers] if the results are just 
interpreted as reflecting determinants of some component of subjective well being or one measure of subjective well 
being instead of true utility". 
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Blanchflower (2007), Easterlin (2003), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Gilbert (2006), Graham (2010, 
2011), Lucas et al. (2004), Layard (2011), Oswald and Wu (2010); Powdthavee (2010), Smith et 
al (2005), Ubel et al (2005).  In general economists have focused on modelling two fairly simple 
questions, one on life satisfaction and one on happiness.  These are typically asked as follows. 
Q1 Happiness – (e.g. from the US General Social Survey) 
"Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very 
happy, pretty happy or not too happy?" 
Q2 Life satisfaction – from the Eurobarometer Surveys 
"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied 
with the life you lead?" 
 
The standard approach to assessing responses to happiness questions is to estimate an equation 
with the happiness response as the dependent variable using ordinary least squares (OLS) or 
ordered logit from a large-scale individual survey.  Higher values of the dependent variable are 
associated with higher levels of happiness.  Generally, the use of OLS or ordered logit makes 
little difference (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).  The happiness approach in measuring 
the effects of inflation and unemployment on welfare is therefore based on estimating 
regressions of the form (see e.g., Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006 and Heinz 2007): 
(1) Life Satisfactioncti = α Unemploymentct + β Inflationct + γ Being unemployedcti 
+ δ Ωcti + γc + ηt + μcti. 
Where Life Satisfactioncti is the proxy for utility of individual i in country c at time t and comes 
directly from individual answering those subjective well-being questions.  Unemploymentct and 
Inflationct measure the respective macroeconomic rates at country and year in which the 
respondent live.  Being unemployedcti is one of the set of dummies reflecting employment status 
and takes the value of 1 if the respondent is unemployed (and actively seeking) when surveyed.  
The other employment status dummies (e.g., being self-employed, student) together with other 
relevant personal characteristics (age, gender, income, marital status, education) are denoted by 
Ωcti. γc, ηt denote country and time fixed effects, while μcti is the error term.  Equation (1) can be 
seen as a reduced form of a (subjective) welfare function in which inflation and unemployment 
are assumed to affect directly the individual’s utility instead of indirectly via consumption, as in 
standard economic models.  In this regression, the estimate of α and β provide the size of the 
weight of unemployment and inflation on welfare, respectively, and their ratio α/ β can be seen as 
marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment (i.e., a weighted misery ratio).  
Note that because equation (1) controls for individual’s job market status, the cost of 
unemployment measured by α provide an estimate for the average person.  Therefore both the 
total cost of unemployment and the inflation/unemployment ratio need to include the individual 
cost of becoming unemployed γ (see also Di Tella et al., 2001).  Previous studies have found that 
both inflation and unemployment decrease life satisfaction in OECD countries and Latin America, 
however there is less agreement about the size of the marginal rate of substitution (Ruprah and 
Luengas, 2011).  We will return to this in Section 3. 
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The size of the signal-to-noise ratio linking utility to subjective measures of well-being cannot be 
determined, but, from the psychological and medical perspectives, there are corroborating 
objective measures in relation to subjective well-being. Positive covariance with measures of 
subjective well-being is observed in assessments of the person’s happiness by friends and family 
members, assessments of the person’s happiness by his or her spouse, heart rate and blood-
pressure measures of response to stress, the risk of coronary heart disease, duration of authentic 
or so-called Duchenne smiles 8 , skin-resistance, measures of response to stress, electro-
encephalogram measures of prefrontal brain activity and even standing heart rate and blood 
pressure (Blanchflower et al., 2011).  
 
This approach begs the question as to whether comparisons of life satisfaction across individuals 
are meaningful given language and cultural differences across countries.  This is not an issue in 
our context as equation (1) estimates within-country effects, holding potential differences 
constant. 9.  Nevertheless, cross-country comparisons are important in that they tell us something 
about the validity of happiness data.  One way to do this is to check for objective measures that 
might corroborate happiness research’s findings. Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) found that 
happier nations report systematically lower levels of hypertension. Happiness and blood pressure 
are negatively correlated across countries (r = -0.6).  This seems to represent a first step toward 
the validation of cross-country estimates. Denmark has the lowest reported levels of high blood 
pressure in their data. Denmark also has the highest happiness levels. Portugal has the highest 
reported blood pressure levels and the lowest levels of life satisfaction and happiness.  It appears 
there is a case to take more seriously the subjective happiness measurements made across 
countries and it seems meaningful to do cross-country comparisons (Blanchflower 2007). 
Oswald and Wu (2010) using data across states within USA show that there is a match between 
these subjective measures of well-being and objective measures.  
It is apparent that there is a great deal of stability in happiness and life satisfaction equations, no 
matter what country is looked at, what dataset or time period used, whether the question relates 
to life satisfaction or happiness, or how the responses are coded (whether in three, four, five or 
even as many as ten categories).  Well-being is correlated with life events such as being 
unemployed or being married (Clark et al. 2008 and Frijters et al. 2011).  In particular, 
economics research has been focusing on the relationship between income and happiness and 
interdependence of preferences.  In general, Gardner and Oswald (2007) have found that Britons 
who receive lottery wins of between £1,000 and £120,000 go on to exhibit better psychological 
health. But individuals in the USA were found to be less happy if their incomes are far above 
those of the poorest people (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004).  People, however, do appear to 
compare themselves more with well-off families, so that perhaps they get happier the closer their 
                                                     
8 A Duchenne smile occurs when both the zygomatic major and obicularus orus facial muscles fire, and human 
beings identify these as ‘genuine’ smiles (Ekman et al., 1988; Ekman et al., 1990). 
 
9 Another way to overcome this is to compare countries where the same language is spoken - Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, UK, USA (as in Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). In those papers it was argued that Australia's high 
ranking on the HDI measure was a paradox given its much lower ranking on happiness and job satisfaction scores. 
See Wolfers and Leigh (2006) for a different interpretation of the HDI-happiness relationship in Australia. 
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income comes to that of rich people around them.  Relative income certainly appears to matter. 
Luttmer (2005), for the USA, finds that higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower 
levels of self-reported happiness, controlling for an individual's own income. 10   The main 
findings concerning personal characteristics Ωcti from happiness and life satisfaction equations 
such as (1) can be summarized as follows.11 
Happiness is higher among: 
Women 
Married people 
The highly educated 
The healthy 
Those with high income 
The young and the old – happiness is U-shaped in age 
Happiness is lower among: 
Newly divorced and separated people 
Adults in their mid to late 40s 
The unemployed 
The disabled 
Immigrants and minorities 
Those in poor health 
Commuters (Kahneman et al, 2004) 
Those who live in polluted areas (Levinson, 2012). 
Turning our attention to macroeconomic factors, happiness has been found to positively correlate 
with higher GDP per capita (see e.g., Wolfers and Leigh (2006)).  When a nation is poor it 
appears that extra riches raise happiness.  However, income growth in richer countries is not 
correlated with growth in happiness: this is the Easterlin hypothesis (Easterlin, 1974).12 Alesina 
et al (2004), find, using a sample of individuals across the USA (1981-1996) and Europe (1975-
1992) that individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves as happy when inequality is 
high, even controlling for individual income.  The effect is stronger in Europe than in the USA  
Di Tella, McCullough and Oswald (2001) show that people are happier when both inflation and 
unemployment are low.  They find that unemployment depresses well-being more than does 
inflation.  This analysis has been updated by Heinz (2010) who found that inflation and 
unemployment lower life satisfaction in a sample of Western European countries in the period 
                                                     
10 Two facts stand out from studies of life satisfaction and happiness in developed countries. First, it is interesting 
how little has changed – the distributions in the early 1970s are virtually identical to those observed in 2006. 
Second, only a very small proportion of respondents report that they were 'not at all satisfied' with their lives, or in 
the case of the USA, that they were 'not at all happy'. Most people report that they are happy or satisfied with their 
lives. 
 
11  For in-depth reviews on the happiness research in economics see Frey and Stutzer (2002), Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2006 and, more recently, Blanchflower and Oswald (2011) and MacKerron, (2012). 
 
12 For different points of view regarding the Easterlin paradox see e.g., Wolfers and Stevenson (2008) and Deaton 
(2008). 
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1990-2002.  Wolfers (2003) has shown that greater macro volatility undermines well-being. 
Wolfers found that eliminating unemployment volatility would raise well-being by an amount 
roughly equal to that from lowering the average level of unemployment by a quarter of a per 
cent.  Interestingly, the effects of inflation volatility on well-being are markedly smaller.  We 
build on and update these findings below. 
 
2. Misery ratios and views on inflation and unemployment 
In this section we introduce an additional measure that captures a different aspect of the 
interaction of inflation and unemployment from the misery index and more closely aligns with 
the wellbeing literature - the misery ratio, which is the ratio of the unemployment rate to the 
inflation rate.  Thus, if the unemployment rate is 4% and the inflation rate is 4%, the misery 
index is 8.  But the misery ratio is 1.  Below we will link this concept to the marginal rate of 
substitution between unemployment and inflation – the rate at which at which individuals (or 
societies) trade off inflation and unemployment, while holding welfare (happiness) constant. 
The (standard) misery index and misery ratio implicitly assume equal weights for inflation and 
unemployment rate, while the happiness approach will provide survey evidence on the weights 
from the subjective well-being perspective.  Note that we arbitrarily treat the unemployment 
rate as the numerator and the inflation rate as the denominator in our misery ratio.  Thus, 
higher rates of unemployment imply a higher misery ratio for a given inflation rate. 
Table 1 uses data for fourteen Western European countries from the 1970s through 2010. It 
shows that the misery ratio has risen since the 1970s, reflecting the greater success that 
governments have had in controlling inflation, compared with their ability to reduce 
unemployment. Table 2 presents the most recent unemployment and inflation rates as well as the 
misery index.  It is especially low in Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 
countries which tend to give relatively more weight to the importance of maintaining low 
inflation.  The misery ratio is especially high in the countries most impacted by the Great 
Recession: Greece (30); Spain (10); Portugal (7); and Ireland (8).  Given the sharp increases in 
unemployment in these countries, while inflation has been relatively muted, it is no surprise that 
they score relatively high on the misery ratio.  
This is confirmed when investigating views and opinions regarding the most important problems 
in Europe – a type of analysis that closely resembles Shiller (1997).  In two recent 
Eurobarometer surveys taken in May 2010 and May 20103 (#73.4 and #79.3 respectively) the 
overall proportion of respondents saying that unemployment was the most important problem 
was considerably higher than the proportion saying they were most worried about inflation (see 
Table 3).  Indeed, in the perception of European citizens, unemployment exceeded inflation as 
the more important problem by a factor of around 2.5, and in several countries, including 
Denmark, Spain and Sweden by a factor of more than ten. 
3. Trade-offs between unemployment and inflation 
Having defined the misery ratio at the macro level, we now examine a closely related micro 
concept.  We estimate the relative weight of unemployment and inflation in individual well-
being equations.  We assemble the data for this exercise as follows: a 4-step life satisfaction 
question, Q2 above, has been asked in some, but not all, Eurobarometer Surveys conducted for 
the EU since 1973 for all member countries.  As new countries such as Greece, Spain and 
Portugal joined, they were added to the surveys so there are fewer years of data available for 
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them.  In 2004, the year in which they joined the EU, the A8 countries – the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – were added. Bulgaria 
and Romania also joined in that year, as did two further EU Candidate Countries - Croatia and 
Turkey. Data are available on Norway for 1990-1995 when it was an EU Candidate Country, 
and a member of the OECD. Overall, we make use of micro-data on over 1.1 million 
individuals from thirty one countries - Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; 
Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; the Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; 
Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden, Turkey and the UK.  We then map in annual 
data on unemployment, inflation along with GDP growth for each country using Eurostat 
data.13  
 
In Table 4a we estimate life satisfaction equations as in Equation 1 using OLS.  It is clear that the 
direction of causation here runs from unemployment and inflation to well-being; the reverse 
causation is unlikely to be a major issue here.  To deal with institutional factors which vary by 
country we include country fixed effects.  To account for time varying factors we include year 
dummies. 
 
The dependent variable is the 4-step life satisfaction question as reported in Section 1 (Q2).  
Regressors include the inflation rate (i.e., the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices or HICP) 
and the unemployment rate, which are both drawn from Eurostat.  Column 1 includes only three 
variables – the unemployment and inflation rates and four labor force status dummies, although 
we only report the results on being unemployed.  The excluded category is being employed.  All 
the remaining equations in Table 4a include a full set of year and country dummies. Columns 2-5 
also include a standard set of controls for gender, marital status, age, home-working, retired 
and being a student.  In all cases the standard errors are clustered at the country*year level to 
overcome the problem of the common error component caused by the inclusion of country and 
year level variables in an individual-level regression.  This is known as the Moulton (1986, 
1991) standard-error problem which is fixed by clustering. 
 
As expected, both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate have negative coefficients, 
suggesting that an increase in either lowers happiness; below we use these data to estimate the 
weighted misery ratio. Column 2 adds personal controls, which have little impact on our overall 
estimates.  In all cases both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate are highly significant 
and negative. In addition the being unemployed dummy is also significantly negative with a t-
statistic of around fifty.  It appears that unemployment makes people very unhappy, which 
suggests it is unlikely to be voluntary.  In column 3 annual GDP growth rates are added for a 
subset of countries to allow for business cycle effects but this variable is insignificant.  Indeed, in 
no specification we tried was this variable ever found to be significant and hence was dropped.  
Column 4 adds dummy variables taking the value 1  if the inflation or unemployment rates were 
in the 95th percentile and zero otherwise. These are  both negative and large.  The unemployment 
                                                     
13  We have the following years of data by country - Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK (1975-2012); Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995-2012); Greece (1981-2012); Portugal, 
Spain (1985- 2012); Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, (2004-2012), Norway (1990-1995), Turkey (2004-2011); Iceland (2010-2011). 
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term is significant while the inflation term is not, so it is omitted in column 5.  It is high 
unemployment of over 19% that hurts.  We also included a dummy variable for deflation, but 
this was never significant (results not reported). 
 
In Table 4b we experiment with leads and lags on both unemployment rate and inflation. This 
can also be seen as test to potential simultaneity bias. Column 1 adds 1 year lags to current 
levels. Neither of the lags is significant.  The same is true in the second column when we include 
two-period lags.  In column 3 we include one year leads, to begin to capture the notion that 
future unemployment and inflation may affect current utility:only the term in future 
unemployment seems to influence current well-being. Neither inflation term is now significant. 
In column 4 we reintroduce current values of inflation and unemployment, but neither is 
significant.  These estimates use OLS, which may be biased since the expectations in Equation 3 
should reflect predicted rather than actual outcomes.  Such predictions must be formed with 
information available to individuals in the current period. In column 5 we report an instrumental 
variable estimate based on this approach: the one-year-ahead variables, are instrumented by their 
current and past values.  Again, it is only the unemployment variable that is significant. 
 
What do these estimates suggest about the relative size of the effects from the unemployment 
rate and the inflation rate?  These are summarized in Table 5.  The effects of unemployment and 
inflation, in row 1 of Table 5 - which is taken from column 2 of Table 4a - have coefficients of - 
0.0168 and –.0037, respectively.  These represent the effect upon well-being of a one 
percentage point change in each of the two independent variables.  Following Di Tella et al 
(2001) – henceforth DMO – the implicit welfare-constant trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment can now be calculated.  As in conventional economic theory, the DMO 
methodology leads to a measure of the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and 
unemployment – the slope of the indifference curve.  This is analogous to the misery ratio, 
though it is weighted by the parameters α, β and (a transformation of) γ (see equation 1) and 
conditioned by the explanatory variables absent inflation and unemployment.  
 
There are two consequences of unemployment – society as a whole becomes more fearful of 
unemployment (Blanchflower, 1991, Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2009, and Luechinger et al., 
2010) and some people actually lose their jobs; there are aggregate and personal effects of 
unemployment. DMO argue that a way has to be found to measure the two unpleasant 
consequences of a rise in unemployment.  DMO develop a way to take account of the extra cost 
of joblessness, namely, to calculate the sum of the aggregate and personal effects of 
unemployment.  Our results are consistent with DMO (and the vast majority of works in 
happiness economics), who argue that a person who becomes unemployed experiences a larger 
reduction in wellbeing than the average individual.  The loss from being unemployed, equals the 
coefficient on being ‘unemployed’ in a life-satisfaction micro regression. In column 2 of Table 
4, this coefficient is -0.3957 and is highly statistically significant.  
 
When the unemployment rate increases by one percentage points, one percent of the population 
suffers this loss of well-being.  In societal terms this is equivalent to a loss of about -0.004 (-
0.3957 multiplied by the fraction of people who lose their jobs which is 0.01).  It is then feasible 
to compute the entire well-being cost of a one per cent increase in the unemployment rate is 
therefore given by the sum of two components.  This gives 0.0168 + 0.004 = 0.0208 as society’s 
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overall well-being cost of a one per cent increase in the unemployment rate.  This can be 
interpreted as a combination of the direct effect of unemployment on well-being, plus the 
happiness costs associated with increased fear of unemployment and welfare interdependency 
effects on the associates of the unemployed. 
Our results suggest that the well-being cost of a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate equals the loss brought about by an extra 5.6 percentage points of inflation.  How do we get 
this?  The reason is that (0.0208/0.0037) = 5.6, where 0.0208 is the marginal unemployment 
effect on well-being, and 0.0037 is the marginal inflation effect on well-being from row 3 of 
column 2 of Table 4a.  Hence 5.6 is the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and 
unemployment, conditional on the other explanatory variables. It is therefore our estimate of the 
weighted misery ratio based on individual data and correcting for individual characteristics.  This 
is more than treble the 1.66 obtained by DMO.  Note that DMO use three year rolling averages 
and adjust for omitted variable bias by running first stage micro life satisfaction equations in 
each country and year cell and then using the averaged residuals at the second stage of the 
regression.  Using the micro data and adjusting the standard errors by clustering, the RHS 
variables by country and year accomplishes essentially the same adjustment. DMO do not make 
clear why they use three year rolling averages and we can see no compelling reasons to do so 
here; in any case this is unlikely to matter. 
There is quite considerable variation in unemployment and inflation rates in the sample. 
However, the estimates cannot be generalized to every potential misery ratio.  Hyperinflation 
scenarios are not part of stable economies analyzed in the paper.14  We are unable to determine 
whether our results would be the same if inflation were 1000% and unemployment was 4%, 
because the inflation data we have has a minimum of -4.5% (Ireland, 2009) and a maximum of 
32.0% (Macedonia, 2010).  We experimented with alternative specifications of the inflation rate 
to allow for the possibility that there are non-linear effects from inflation, including entering the 
inflation rate and its square and the square was never significant.  
It is also possible to obtain estimates for sub-groups.  Here we exclude the higher inflation 
term for simplicity and in part for sample size reasons.  Table 5 shows that the misery ratio for 
1975-2005 is much lower than it is over subsequent years (1.5 versus 3.9 respectively, noting 
of course that these are different than for the whole period, which arises from differences in 
the other coefficients).  Western Europe has a higher elasticity than for Eastern Europe (4.3 
and 21.9 respectively). Interestingly, the five core Eurozone countries - Germany, Austria, 
France, Finland, Netherlands and Austria – have an elasticity of 0.7 suggesting they fear 
inflation more than unemployment. Excluding these five ‘inflation hawk’ countries our 
elasticity estimate rises to 5.6.  This estimate is in line with the textbook notion that 
individuals in the core countries of the Euro Area prefer "hard-nosed" governments (i.e. a 
governments which attach a lot of weight to fighting inflation), while the periphery has a 
predisposition for "wet governments" (i.e. governments which attach a higher weight to 
                                                     
14 Although, during the 20th Century there were quite a number of hyperinflationary events these can be put into 
three rough categories: post-war disruption, post-Soviet collapse, and socialist-populist regimes. Hyperinflation is 
not considered in the context of DSGE models calibrated for EU or US either. 
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fighting unemployment).15  We find evidence consistent with DMO for the years they looked 
at pre 1992 that the misery ratio is under two (1.8) but much higher since then for a consistent 
group of countries.  
Females are more worried about unemployment than men (6.3 and 4.9 respectively). 
Conversely, the young put the greatest weight on inflation while the old put greater weights on 
unemployment. 16  This runs counter to the evidence that entering the labor market during 
economic downturns has long term negative effects.  Chances are these older folk have 
experienced unemployment and realize its lasting consequences.  Unemployment hurts for a 
long time, especially long duration unemployment, which in the case of youngsters can cause 
permanent scars rather than temporary blemishes (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011a, 2011b). 
Older workers get over long spells of unemployment while youngsters don't, especially if they 
are unable to make an initial toe-hold in the labour market.  However, when looking at the 
coefficients, the findings seem to be driven by the lower coefficient on inflation for the 
elderly. A possible potential explanation is that the elderly are more able to ensure that their 
assets (e.g. houses that they own) are less affected by inflation.  We find strong evidence that 
unemployment lowers well-being markedly more than inflation does.  Inflation rates above 
25% do have especially large effects, as do unemployment rates of over 25%.  
It is then feasible to obtain estimates for sub-groups. Here we exclude the higher inflation term 
for simplicity and in part for sample size reasons. Table 5 shows that the misery ratio for the 
EU27 is similar to that of the Euro Zone (3.7 and 3.8 respectively).  Given such large sample 
sizes in every case the estimated ratios are significantly different from each other at 
conventional levels of significance.  Western Europe has a higher elasticity than for Eastern 
Europe (4.39 and 2.0 respectively).  Interestingly, the five core Eurozone countries - Germany, 
Austria, France, Finland, Netherlands and Austria – have an elasticity of 0.73 suggesting they 
fear inflation more than unemployment. Excluding these five ‘inflation hawk’ countries our 
elasticity estimate rises to 6.4.  This estimate is in line with the textbook notion that 
individuals in the core countries of the Euro Area prefer "hard-nosed" governments (i.e. a 
governments which attach a lot of weight to fighting inflation), while the periphery has a 
predisposition for "wet governments" (i.e. governments which attach a higher weight to 
fighting unemployment).17  Females are more worried about unemployment than men (3.9 and 
3.5 respectively).  The least educated, the married, the widowed and the old are more 
concerned about unemployment – they put the highest weight on unemployment.  
                                                     
15 As a corollary, this result gives an indication of the possible tensions between the core and the periphery of the 
Euro Area; in this context it is of vital importance for the smooth functioning of the Eurosystem the institutional 
framework and by decision-making process of the European Central Bank 
 
16 In contrast Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) show that older people in the UK have higher expectations for 
inflation because they have experienced periods of higher inflation over their adult lives. They found that people in 
the age group 45–54 had experienced the highest level of inflation, an average inflation rate of 7.3% over their adult 
lives. They found that lifetime inflation experience has a significant effect on people’s inflation expectations. 
 
17 As a corollary, this result gives an indication of the possible tensions between the core and the periphery of the 
Euro Area; in this context it is of vital importance for the smooth functioning of the Eurosystem the institutional 
framework and by decision-making process of the European Central Bank 
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The result that the old care most about unemployment is especially puzzling.  It does not 
appear to be a function of the use of an age quadratic; the results are the same no matter how 
we specify the age variables in Table 4.  We re-estimated all equations with single year of age 
dummies and the results were the same.  The result that the old have a higher misery ratio is 
driven primarily by the lower coefficient for inflation for the elderly rather than any difference 
in the unemployment coefficient.  An anonymous referee suggested that one factor that might 
drive this difference is house prices, in part because the old are more likely to own their own 
homes and don't mind higher inflation as it adds to their wealth.  The opposite, of course, goes 
for the young who still have to buy their houses and hence suffer from higher inflation.   
 
4. Discussion 
Macroeconomic social welfare functions tend to focus on inflation and unemployment.18  The 
existence of a tradeoff between these variables allows central bankers to choose their short-run 
position on the Phillips curve.  Starting from these premises, the fundament question for a central 
bank is to assign weights to unemployment and inflation to maximize social welfare. In other 
words, the central bank implicitly determines the marginal rate of substitution between inflation 
and unemployment.  But our estimates of this quantity seem much higher than the implicit 
marginal rates of substitution held by most central banks.  There are various reasons why this 
might be the case 
 
One argument is that central banks implicitly or explicitly take the view that much of the 
variation in unemployment is due to changes in the natural rate, which are not susceptible to 
monetary policy intervention.  This perhaps suggests higher frequency changes in the supply-
side conditions of the labor market than many labor economists might expect.  Nevertheless, 
since calibration of the natural rate may be problematic, this argument provides one possible 
rationale for central banks to focus monetary policy primarily on inflation. In our framework 
individuals cannot distinguish between a cyclical movement in unemployment and a change in 
the natural rate – both are equally costly in terms of well-being.  Central banks may take a 
different view of the welfare implications of a change in unemployment depending whether they 
are believed to be the result of cyclical or structural changes in unemployment.  
 
A second argument is based on our finding that the Phillips curve is rather steep. This finding 
derives from the following argument: our well-being regressions are static.  There are clearly no 
dynamics associated with well-being, inflation or unemployment. We have therefore not taken 
account of the role of persistence in our estimates.19  There is a strand of the well-being literature 
relating to persistence.  Clark et al. (2001), use panel data to investigate whether an individual’s 
past unemployment affect their current well-being.  They show that unemployment “reduces the 
well-being of those who are currently in work: for them, past unemployment scars” Clark et al. 
(2001, p. 237).20  A similar argument is made for inflation; Blanchflower (2007) shows that “An 
                                                     
18 Frequently unemployment is replaced with output. This rests on the assumption that there is a stable relation 
between the loss in output production and unemployment as postulated by the Okun Law. 
 
19 We are grateful to a referee for this point. 
 
20 A similar conclusion is reached by Knabe and Rätzel (2011); in their analysis, people who have experienced 
unemployment in the past are more likely to be insecure and afraid that this might happen again in the future. 
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individual who has experienced high inflation in the past has lower happiness today, even 
holding constant today’s inflation and unemployment rates”.  There is evidence of persistence at 
the individual level, which is dependent on the availability of panel data. 
There is, however, another approach to persistence in macroeconomics where findings derive 
principally from time series results or calibration.  Consider a Keynesian model, where the 
central bank objective is to minimise a quadratic loss function subject to a linear Phillips curve. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
12 {𝛼𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛽𝑢𝑡2} 
𝑠. 𝑡. : 𝑘𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 = 0 
Where 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡  are inflation and unemployment at time t, respectively. k is the slope of the 
Phillips curve, which measures the response of inflation with relation to cyclical unemployment. 
𝛼 and 𝛽 are the parameters indicating the weights that the central bank assign to inflation and 
unemployment.  The first order condition yields the following solution: 
𝑢𝑡
𝜋𝑡
= 𝛼
𝛽𝑘
 
Our estimates of 𝛼 and 𝛽 give a value for their ratio of 0.26 (this is equal to 1/3.76). The sample 
average for 𝑢 and 𝜋 over our sample period give 𝑢𝑡
𝜋𝑡
= 1.9.  This implies that the sacrifice ratio (-k) is 
equal to -0.14 and that the Phillips curve is rather steep with a gradient = -7.14..21 22 This suggests a 
labour market with few and weak rigidities; prices respond quickly to movements in aggregate 
demand. Following from this finding, one might argue that the central bank does not need to be 
particularly responsive to the unemployment rate because, with such a steep Phillips curve, 
average durations are likely to be short if aggregate demand is relatively volatile. 
 
A third argument takes our fining in relation to the Phillips curve in a somewhat different 
direction which focuses on the dynamics of the relationships, rather than focussing on the static 
framework that we have used thus far. Thus, consider the role of persistence by restating 
Equation 1 in more general dynamic form:  
(2)           𝑈𝐶𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝐸�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑖∞
𝑡=0+ 𝛽𝐸�𝛿𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑡𝑖 +  𝛿 𝜴𝑐𝑡𝑖 +  𝛾𝑐 +  𝜂𝑡 +  𝜇𝑐𝑡𝑖∞
𝑡=0
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
21 We thank T.S. Fuerst for this point. 
 
22 The sacrifice ratio is the measure of the costs of lowering inflation by one percentage point or the amount of 
increased unemployment that will be created to reduce inflation by a percentage point. 
 
14 
 
The left hand side variable, U, now corresponds more closely to the conventional 
macroeconomic understanding of utility.  The right hand side includes expected future levels of 
inflation and unemployment, discounted at the rate δ, as well as their current levels.  The 
remaining terms are identical to those in Equation (1), without loss of generality.  The “being 
unemployed” variable is subsumed within the unemployment variable, without affecting the 
argument.  This specification tries to more closely represent the problem faced by the central 
bank, which might be characterised as seeking to maximize the present value of aggregate utility 
rather than focussing simply on its current level.  This allows for the possibility that, at the 
individual level, the future may be regarded with positive or negative anticipation.  
We already know that the past matters. Past events are part of the information set that determines 
current well-being and there is evidence of the persistence of the effects of past unemployment 
and inflation on current well-being.  But there is no evidence from individual surveys of the 
effect of expected unemployment and inflation on current well-being.  Any such impact will also 
clearly depend on the rate at which the future is discounted. 
Omitting future expectations from our specification could therefore have led to bias in the results 
we presented in Table 4a.  What might be the extent of this bias?  To keep the analysis simple, 
assume that both unemployment and inflation follow AR(1) processes.  After some simple 
manipulation, one can show that the relationship between our estimates and the “true” value of 
the marginal rate of substitution is given by: 
(3) 𝛼
𝛽
= 𝛼�
𝛽�
(1−𝛿𝜌𝑈)(1−𝛿𝜌𝜋)  
where ρU and ρπ  are, respectively, the coefficients associated with the AR(1) processes in 
unemployment and inflation and the estimated coefficients from Equation (1) are 𝛼�  and ?̂? . 
Equation (3) shows that the modification to the estimated ratio from Equation (1) depends on the 
relative degree of persistence (size of the AR(1) coefficient) in unemployment and inflation. If 
unemployment is substantially more persistent than inflation, then the estimated marginal rate of 
substitution from cross-sectional data may be upward biased.  This bias also increases with the 
discount rate.  
To investigate these issues, we estimated AR(1) coefficients from annual unemployment and 
inflation data which were measured consistently by Eurostat for the period 1996-2012. Our 
estimate of the AR(1) unemployment coefficient ρU was 0.815 and for the AR(1) inflation 
coefficient ρπ was 0.338.  Next we needed to select a discount rate – we chose 0.99, implying 
that future inflation and unemployment have a very strong influence on current well-being. Why 
choose 0.99?  Carroll and Samwick (1997) calculated an empirical distribution of discount 
factors for all agents using information on the elasticity of assets with respect to uncertainty: the 
two standard deviation bands range in the interval (0.91-0.99).  Samwick (1998) used wealth 
holdings at diﬀerent ages to infer the underlying distribution of discount factors: for about 70 
percent of the households, he found mean discount factors of about 0.99; for about 25 percent of 
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households, he estimates discount factors below 0.95.  Gourninchas and Parker (2002) find 
estimates of about 0.93 for the general population.  
The value of α/β in Equation (3) then solves to 1.63.  Thus, if this model of forward expectations 
is valid, the marginal rate of substitution is substantially reduced, though still greater than unity, 
and though the central bank would pay more attention to inflation, the implication of the results 
would still be that unemployment be given a greater weight.  Of course, any reduction in the 
discount rate below 0.99 would increase this weight further and, in the limit when δ = 0, the 
marginal rate of substitution would return to 5.6. Nevertheless, taking account of dynamics 
seems to result in a lower estimate of the marginal rate of substitution and provides another 
rationale for central banks, and the politicians who design their objective function, giving less 
weight to unemployment than our static estimates of the tradeoff between unemployment and 
inflation might suggest.  
There are arguments for not pressing this persistence model too strongly.  First, it does not in any 
way disaggregate the population: we know already that responses to unemployment and inflation 
differ across populations.  Such heterogeneity may lead to aggregation bias. There is also 
evidence that discount rates vary across groups (Carroll, 1997 and Liabson et al., 2003).  For 
example, our populations have finite lives, which suggest that there should either be an upper 
limit on the future number of time periods in (3) or a more complex overlapping generations 
structure.  In both these formulations, for example, one would expect older agents to discount the 
future more heavily.  
These three arguments – natural rate variation, steepness of the Phillips curve and differences in 
persistence - provide useful qualifications to our simple static results.  They suggest reasons why 
the central bank’s implicit preference orderings do not directly reflect those of individuals based 
on static survey analyses. Perhaps, paraphrasing Knabe and Rätzel (2011), unemployment not 
only scars individuals but also scares them.  Although it is not possible to provide a clear 
explanation of the reason underlining these differences between theory and surveys, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2013, p. 642) show that “economic experts seem to provide answers very different 
than those of average” individuals. This is consistent with our argument that the central bank 
may choose to focus on inflation even though the public would prefer it to concentrate on 
unemployment because it has access to a wider information set than most individuals. It may 
implicitly also have lower rates of time preference, which would imply giving greater attention 
to arguments involving the dynamics of inflation and unemployment.   
Our results suggest that this divergence between popular opinion and the policies being pursued 
by the central bank are rather severe in the Euro area.  In fact, we document not only a division 
between the policymakers and the individuals of the eighteen countries adhering to the single 
monetary policy, but also a non-negligible split between core and periphery countries.  The 
policy implication from the fact that unemployment is more costly than inflation and some 
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degree of heterogeneity exists within the Euro-area, is that a gradualist disinflationary policy is 
likely to be more desirable from a welfare point of view.  
5. Conclusions 
During the last three decades theory and practice of central banking have witnessed a remarkable 
convergence throughout the world.  The pre-crisis consensus was that a conservative central 
bank and an inflation target (or reference value) was all that was required for a central bank to 
gain credibility and ultimately to maximize social welfare.  After the Great Recession, this 
consensus has been challenged and from many parts of the society it is increasingly seen as 
inadequate. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation.  
The approach differs substantially from the standard macroeconomic modelling.  We make use 
of a large European dataset, covering the period 1975 to 2013, to estimate happiness equations in 
which an individual subjective measure of life satisfaction is regressed against unemployment 
and inflation rate (controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects).  We 
interpret the coefficients on unemployment and inflation as implicit weights on a subjective 
welfare function. We compute a weighted misery ratio that can be interpreted as the trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment that will leave people, on average, equally happy.  The 
main results of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
• Unemployment lowers happiness of the unemployed but also the happiness of 
everyone else. 
 
• We estimate the unemployment/inflation trade-off as approximately 5.6, when the whole 
sample is used. That is to say a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment lower well-
being nearly six times more than an equivalent rise in inflation. Using only the five main 
euro area countries that are especially worried about inflation – Germany, Austria, 
France, Finland and Austria – the elasticity decreases to one. 
 
• We find that , women and, somewhat surprisingly, the old put the highest weight on 
unemployment 
 
Our results using survey data depart from the more common finding in the macroeconomic 
literature which puts more weight on inflation rather than on unemployment. In order to 
investigate this further, we have analyzed the role of persistence using a simple model of forward 
expectations.  The marginal rate of substitution is substantially reduced, though still greater than 
unity, and though the central bank would pay more attention to inflation, the implication of the 
results would still be that unemployment be given a greater weight.  
 
Although obtained from a different approach, our results compare with attitudinal surveys in 
which respondents are asked their view on unemployment and inflation directly.  Shiller (1997) 
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showed that people tend to dislike unemployment more than inflation.  We confirm the same 
results using recent surveys conducted on our European sample.  A higher proportion of 
individuals report that unemployment is the major problem the economy faces than is the case 
for inflation in most countries.  In a nutshell, unemployment hurts more than inflation.  
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Table 1. European Misery Ratio 
Misery Ratio          1975-1979         1980-1989             1990-1999             2000-2010       
Belgium  0.76 2.46 4.26 4.34  
Denmark  0.68 1.31 3.68 2.29  
Finland   1.30 10.30 4.69  
France  0.43 2.38 4.85 5.19  
Germany  0.92 0.40 2.50 5.43  
Greece   1.81 0.76 3.07  
Ireland  0.66 1.03 5.10 1.80  
Italy  0.44 0.30 2.57 3.84  
Luxembourg  0.07 4.15 0.77 1.16  
Netherlands  0.78 0.54 2.38 1.35  
Portugal    0.72 2.39  
Spain    4.09 4.15  
UK  0.29 1.56 2.23 3.14  
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 2.  Unemployment and HCIP inflation rate October 2013 and Misery ratios 
                                   Unemployment rate        Inflation rate               Absolute Misery ratio 
Austria  4.8 2.3  2.1 
Belgium  9.0 1.4  6.4 
Bulgaria  13.2 1.0 13.2 
Cyprus   17.0 0.8 21.3 
Czech Republic 6.8 1.6 4.3 
Denmark 6.7 0.8 8.4 
Estonia  8.8 3.5 2.5 
Finland  8.1 2.5 3.2 
France  10.9 1.1 9.9 
Germany 5.2 1.7 3.1 
UK  7.5 2.1 3.6 
Greece  27.3 -0.4 68.3 
Hungary  17.6 2.5 7.0 
Ireland  12.6 0.7 18.0 
Italy  12.5 1.6 7.8 
Latvia  11.9 0.3 39.7 
Lithuania 11.1 1.6 6.9 
Luxembourg 5.9 1.9 3.1 
Malta  6.4 1.4 4.6 
Netherlands 7.0 2.9 2.4 
Poland  10.2 1.1 9.3 
Portugal  15.7 0.8 19.6 
Romania  7.3 3.7 2.0 
Slovakia  13.9 2.0 7.0 
Slovenia  10.1 2.2 4.6 
Spain  26.7 2.0 13.4 
Sweden  7.9 0.5 15.8 
Source: Eurostat and OECD 
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Table 3. Views on Unemployment and Inflation 
 
                                            Unemployment                             Inflation 
                                          2010                2013                 2010 2013 
Austria 38  31  34 38 
Belgium 44 40 20 16 
Bulgaria 53 62 22 24 
Croatia 63 76 18 17 
Cyprus  40 72 24 3 
Czech Republic 48 45 21 30 
Denmark 37 62 3 5 
Estonia 70 33 21 51 
Finland 51 50 11 18 
France 58 66 16 17 
Germany East 44 27 39 33 
Germany West 39 19 23 21 
Great Britain 31 35 12 10 
Greece 44 65 25 10 
Hungary 60 59 29 25 
Iceland 51 10 14 22 
Ireland 65 67 12 16 
Italy 49 59 26 22 
Latvia 67 55 9 16 
Lithuania 60 46 28 36 
Luxembourg 42 43 28 22 
Macedonia 63 61 14 23 
Malta 16 16 37 25 
Montenegro n/a 35 n/a 18 
Netherlands 19 51 9 7 
Northern Ireland 39 40 18 12 
Poland 49 69 26 34 
Portugal 62 71 32 25 
Romania 39 33 26 35 
Slovakia 64 59 22 37 
Slovenia 51 49 19 10 
Spain 72 79 10 7 
Sweden 57 66 3 1 
Turkey 68 45 12 11 
 
Source: Eurobarometers #73.4 May 2010 & #79.3 May 2013 
 
Notes: Question - What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR 
COUNTRY) at the moment?  Unemployment or rising prices/inflation 
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Table 4a. Life satisfaction, unemployment and inflation in 31 European countries, 1975-2013 
  
                                                                    (1)                      (2)                       (3)                            (4)                      (5) 
Unemployment rate -.0247 (7.65) -.0168 (11.70)  -.0148 (8.86) -.0144 (9.34) -.0144 (9.27) 
Unemployment rate >95th pctile    -.0645 (2.52) -.0631 (2.49) 
Inflation rate -.0177 (5.79) -.0037 (2.91) -.0053 (3.88) -.0011 (0.64) -.0034 (2.80) 
Inflation rate>95th pctile    -.0526 (1.79)  
 
Unemployed -.4160 (40.93) -.3957 (52.02) -.3885 (49.21) -.3957 (52.09) -.3957 (52.04)) 
GDP annual % change    .0009 (0.89)  
 
Country dummies No 30 30 30 30  
Year dummies No 37 37 37 37 
Personal controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 3.3052 3.4959 3.2536 3.4727 3.4899 
N 1,214,442 1,181,169 999,092 1,181,169 1,181,169 
 
R2 .0476 .2018 .2163 .2019 .2019 
 
Source: Eurobarometers, 1975-2013. Standard errors are clustered at the level of country and year. Personal controls are age and its 
square 4 marital status dummies, 3 labor force status dummies plus gender. Countries are Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Turkey and UK.   
95th percentile for unemployment is 16.95% and above while for inflation is 13.65% and over. 
  
26 
 
Table 4b. Life satisfaction, unemployment and inflation with leads and lags in 31 European countries, 1975-2013 
  
                                                                    (1)                      (2)                       (3)                            (4)                      (5) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
Unemployment ratet -.0197 (5.39) -.0111 (3.00) -.0049 (1.49) -.0031(0.49) 
Unemployment ratet-1 .0036 (1.02) .0004 (0.11)  -.0007 (0.19) 
Unemployment ratet-2  -.0048 (1.57) 
Unemployment ratet+1   -.0102 (2.92) -.0112 (2.74) -.0149 (7.96) 
Inflation ratet -.0081 (2.76) -.0063 (2.02) -.0036 (1.26) -.0059 (1.50) 
Inflation ratet-1 .0026 (1.01) -.0024 (0.75)  .0011 (0.46) 
Inflation ratet-2  .0023 (0.89) 
Inflation ratet+1   -.0030 (1.00) -.0019 (0.64) -.0026 (1.69) 
  
Unemployed -.3825 (42.83) -.3815 (37.58) -.3747 (40.39) -.3782 (38.36) -.3969 (48.19) 
 
Country dummies 30 30 30 30 30 
Year dummies 36 37 37 37 37 
 
Constant 3.2328 3.2202 3.4727 3.2468 3.5629 
N 999,497 866,397 983,694 945,409 1,080,168 
 
R2 .1886 .1886 .1869 .1824 .1969 
 
Source: Eurobarometers, 1975-2013. Standard errors are clustered at the level of country and year.  Personal controls are age and its 
square 4 marital status dummies, 3 labor force status dummies plus gender. Countries are Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Turkey and UK.   
Instruments in column 5 are the unemployment and inflation rates at t and t-1 
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Table 5. Estimates of the weighted misery ratio  
 
                                                                  Unemployment           Inflation                 Unemployment            Misery ratio  
                                                                        rate                        rate                      coefficient  
 
All (column 2 Table 4) -0.0168 -0.0037 -0.3957 5.6 
1975-2005 -0.0117 -0.01 -0.3785 1.5 
2006-2013 -0.0143 -0.0048 -0.4218 3.9 
      
Eurozone (17) -0.0181 -0.004 -0.4072 5.5 
 5 core Eurozone countries -0.0158 -0.0277 -0.4319 0.7 
Europe minus 5 core Eurozone -0.0167 -0.0037 -0.3956 5.6 
Western Europe -0.0145 -0.0043 -0.3914 4.3 
Eastern Europe -0.0099 -0.0075 -0.4057 1.9 
      
All DMO -0.0180 -0.0036 -0.4008 6.1 
All DMO <1992 -0.0151 -0.0105 -0.4040 1.8 
All DMO >=1992 -0.0185 -0.0036 -0.3995 6.2 
      
Age<25 -0.0108 -0.0064 -0.3351 2.2 
Age 25-34 -0.0145 -0.0065 -0.3796 2.8 
Age 35-44 -0.0171 -0.0041 -0.4453 5.3 
Age 45-54 -0.0194 -0.0040 -0.4716 6.0 
Age 55 & over -0.0179 -0.0015 -0.3791 14.5 
      
Male -0.0166 -0.0043 -0.4651 4.9 
Female -0.0167 -0.0032 -0.3304 6.3 
 
Source: Eurobarometers, 1975-2013.  Notes: all coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5% level.  Each row is obtained 
from a separate regression with age and its square, gender, 5 marital status dummies, year dummies and country dummies.     For 
calculation of unemployment/inflation trade-off see text. DMO countries’ are Belgium; France; Denmark; Greece; Germany; Great 
Britain; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal and Spain from 1975-1991.  Standard errors are clustered by country and 
year.  Five core Eurozone countries = Germany, Austria, France, Finland and the Netherlands. With such large sample sizes, in all cases the 
estimated misery ratios are significantly different from each other. 
